This paper shows that indicators and tests of government solvency should not be used alternatively. We present a simple and intuitive procedure to integrate simultaneously the results from the two approaches to fiscal sustainability. An application to U.S. post-World War II data demonstrates the empirical relevance of the proposed strategy. Our results suggest that U.S. fiscal policy is on a sustainable path, since the negative values of indicators merely reflect cyclical factors.
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Introduction
The sustainability of fiscal policy arguably is one of the most debated issues in current macroeconomics. Following the high debt levels experienced by several developed economies since the early 1980s, concern over increasing government debt and deficits and their negative consequences for macroeconomic stability has attracted considerable interest both in the academic literature and in the policy debate. Two possible strategies for an empirical evaluation of fiscal sustainability, based on the government intertemporal budget constraint, appear to be worth pursuing. One strategy is to construct indicators of the sustainability of fiscal policy, along the lines suggested by Miller (1983) , Buiter (1985 Buiter ( , 1987 , Blanchard (1990) , and Buiter, Corsetti and Rubini (1993) . 1 The other is to implement tests for fiscal solvency, following the seminal works by Hamilton and Flavin (1987) , Trehan and Walsh (1988) , and Bohn (1998) . The indicators presented in the literature are either simple measures mainly based on current information, or summary values of model-based projections of future paths of fiscal policy. The testing techniques so far employed involve unit root tests (Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Wilcox, 1989) , cointegration analysis of fiscal data Walsh, 1988, 1991) , or require the adoption of a model-based sustainability approach (Bohn, 1998 (Bohn, , 2005 .
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that indicators and tests for fiscal sustainability may usefully be integrated. We show that the simultaneous use of indicators and tests provides additional information on the issue of government solvency. Indicators and tests simply reinforce each other when their predictions are not in conflict. However, in the event of conflicting results, indicators may signal the occurrence of a change in policy which may reverse the predictions of tests. This is because indicators respond to a set of current and expected future conditions. Tests, on the other hand, always rely on a sample of past data. For this reason, indicators are faster than tests in responding to changes in fiscal policy regimes. The key point is that a change in regime should cause a structural break in the data generating process of the primary surplus, which can be detected empirically.
We design a simple and intuitive strategy to combine the potentially different results of indicators and tests. To evaluate the empirical relevance of the proposed procedure, we provide an application to U.S. post-World War II data. Analyzing the case of U.S. fiscal policy proves to be particularly appropriate, for the deterioration in U.S. budget deficits since 2001 has given rise to renewed and widespread concerns over the question of sustainability.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the most commonly used indicators of fiscal sustainability. Section 3 briefly reviews the main procedures to directly test for solvency. Section 4 presents the strategy we propose to combine the use of indicators and tests. Section 5 develops the empirical application to the U.S. fiscal position.
Section 6 concludes.
Indicators of Fiscal Sustainability
The "law of motion" of interest bearing public debt derived from the intertemporal budget constraint can be approximated as:
where ρ is the real rate of return on public debt, n is the rate of growth of real output, t b is the interest bearing public debt at the end of period t, and t s is the primary surplus inclusive of seigniorage revenues. Both t b and t s are ratios to GDP. The assumption of a constant growth-adjusted real rate of interest is primarily made for expositional simplicity.
It does not affect the essence of the present analysis.
Solving forward equation (1) for public debt as a function of future surpluses and the public debt at the terminal date N, one obtains:
Equation (2) implies that when the rate of growth of the economy is greater than the real rate of interest, deficits can always be financed. Hence, "honest" Ponzi games are possible and no problem of solvency arises.
Both equation (1) and (2) have been used to construct indicators of sustainability. Buiter (1985) proposes measures based on the "net worth" approach. Blanchard (1990) suggests the use of two indicators designed to tackle the issue over different time horizons.
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The first indicator, called the primary gap ( t PG ), is given by:
The primary gap is equal to the primary surplus plus the effect of the debt on the new debt creation.
A more complex set of indicators can be derived from equation (2), imposing a final condition on N t b + over a predetermined time horizon N and solving for the primary 2 See also Chouraqui, Hagemann and Sartor (1990) .
Indicators and Tests of Fiscal Sustainability: An Integrated Approach SOAS, University of London surplus, or, alternatively, for the policy variable assumed to guarantee the required fiscal adjustment (tax, government expenditure or transfer rates). In particular, Blanchard (1990) proposes the so-called tax gap, measuring the change in the tax rate that would be necessary to bring the ratio of public debt to GDP at the current level after a given number of years. The tax gap at time t for a period of N years, N t TG , , is given by:
where t τ is the observed tax rate and
where t g is the ratio of public expenditure inclusive of transfers to GDP. Close inspection of equation (5) reveals that when n − ρ and N are not large, the tax rate * , N t τ is approximately equal to the average value of public spending inclusive of transfers over the next N years, plus the interest rate net of economic growth multiplied by the outstanding public debt.
3 Blanchard (1990) suggests to construct this indicator for a small value of N, like three or five years, and for a high value of N, like twenty or fifty years.
In what follows, we are mainly concerned with indicators such as the primary surplus, the primary gap, and the three or five years tax gap. The reason is that these indicators are mainly based on current and expected future conditions according to the available forecasts and thus give simple "model-free" 4 measures of government solvency.
Longer term measures of fiscal sustainability, like the twenty or fifty years tax gap, require 3 As pointed out in Blanchard's analysis, a similar indicator can also be constructed to evaluate the expenditure gap. 4 Gramlich (1990) stresses the importance of model-free measures of sustainability in order to avoid "additional disagreement" among policy makers.
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Tests for Solvency
Tests for solvency based on the present value budget constraint have originally been
proposed by Hamilton and Flavin (1986) . The authors point out the similarity of equation (2) with the model of self-fulfilling hyperinflations first proposed by Flood and Garber (1983) . Equation (2) is an identity and it is always satisfied ex-post. However, it is possible to test whether creditors perceive the government as solvent. This can be done by considering the ex-ante evaluation of (2), and testing the hypothesis that agents evaluate t b as tending to:
where t Ω denotes the information set available at time t. Equation (2a) implies that agents expect the present value of public debt-GDP ratio to approach zero as N tends to infinity, that is:
Equation (2b) is formally equivalent to the condition for ruling out bubbles in Flood and Garber's model, and can be tested along the same lines. In particular, a direct test for debt sustainability which does not require a-priori assumptions on interest rates could usefully be derived employing the methodology proposed by West (1987) for testing the existence of speculative bubbles. Consider the following autoregressive representation of the surplus: ...
, where δ 's are parameters resulting from highly non-linear combinations of theα 's and the discount factor f, and t Φ is the subset of t Ω including only present and lagged values of the surplus. 7 An unrestricted version of the model (6)- (7) can be estimated using OLS to yield, under the null hypothesis of sustainability, consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters. Using equation (2), rewritten in the form ( )
it is also possible to obtain an instrumental variables estimate of f. This estimate is consistent under both the null hypothesis of sustainability and the alternative, and can be combined with the OLS estimates of the parameters in (6)- (7) to perform a Wald test of the non-linear restriction implied by (2a-b).
Tests for fiscal sustainability based on (2a-b) have also been derived analyzing the cointegration properties of fiscal variables. The seminal work by Trehan and Walsh (1988) demonstrates that if revenues, spending and debt have unit roots, a sufficient condition for sustainability is the stationarity of with-interest deficit. Equivalently, it is sufficient that the primary surplus and public debt are cointegrated with a cointegrating vector [1, ( )
Trehan and Walsh (1991) generalize the cointegration analysis of fiscal data incorporating the possibility of a non-stationary with-interest deficit. Specifically, the authors show that the intertemporal budget constraint holds if a quasi-difference of debt
and primary surplus and debt are cointegrated.
As pointed out by Bohn (2005) , Trehan and Walsh (1991) 's conditions imply that a strictly positive relationship between surplus and debt is sufficient for sustainability.
Cointegration between surplus and debt implies that
with 0 ≠ α , is stationary. Substituting (10) into the flow budget constraint (1) yields:
where
. Hence, Trehan and Walsh's condition (9) requires that 0 > α . This ensures sustainability because it guarantees that the growth rate of debt is strictly lower than the (growth-adjusted) real rate of interest (McCallum, 1984) .
As shown by Bohn (1995 Bohn ( , 1998 Bohn ( , 2005 , government solvency can also be tested using a model-based approach. According to this view, sustainability of fiscal policy is a 
where N t Q , is the pricing kernel for contingency claims on period t+N. Combining the Euler equations, characterizing the agents' intertemporal optimality conditions on the consumption-saving decision, with the government's flow budget constraint (expressed with variable interest and growth rates) and applying the transversality condition yields the following intertemporal budget constraint (Bohn, 1995) :
ρ denotes debt at the beginning of period t. Bohn (1998) demonstrates that sustainability can be tested by estimating the following class of policy rules:
where 0 > β and t µ is a bounded set of other determinants of the primary surplus to GDP ratio. 8 A positive reaction coefficient β , in fact, implies: 8 The main advantages of this sustainability test are that it does not require any assumptions on interest rates and it maintains its validity under conditions of uncertainty.
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Note that if public debt and primary surplus ratios to GDP both have unit roots and t µ is stationary, 0 > β ensures cointegration between the two fiscal variables, thus satisfying the sustainability conditions obtained by Trehan and Walsh (1991) . As a result, Trehan and Walsh's cointegration condition linking debt to primary surpluses implies an errorcorrection mechanism that can be interpreted as a fiscal reaction function (Bohn 2007 ).
In synthesis, sustainability surely holds if in the estimated fiscal policy rule one can detect a positive feedback reaction of the primary surplus to the debt-GDP ratio.
Combining Indicators and Tests
The simultaneous use of tests and indicators provides additional information on the issue of government solvency. The two approaches could usefully be integrated. A possible strategy is shown in Figure 1 . The basic idea is that tests and indicators simply reinforce each other when their predictions are not in conflict. In other words, when both tests and indicators (do not) show the existence of a solvency problem, (no) some correction in the fiscal stance is required. In the case of conflicting results, their interpretation is unclear. Indicators may signal the occurrence of a change in policy which may reverse the predictions of tests. A change in the policy regime should, however, cause a structural break in the data generating process of the surplus, which can be detected using, e.g., a Chow-type test on the stability of the parameters of the surplus equation. Whether the results from indicators or from tests should be given priority in the assessment of the sustainability of public debt depend thus on the stability of the surplus equation.
In synthesis, in the case of conflicting results, the predictions of fiscal indicators about the issue of government solvency should be accepted if and only if one is able to detect the occurrence of a structural change in the fiscal policy regime. This is because the validity of all tests of sustainability is seriously questionable in the presence of a structural break. On the other hand, without a systematic break in policy, the predictions of tests are more reliable since the results of indicators are likely to reflect cyclical factors.
An Application to U.S. Data
We apply the strategy suggested to the U. We now test the sustainability of U.S. fiscal policy using historical data. In particular, we test whether the U.S. fiscal history displays a robust positive reaction of the primary surplus-GDP ratio to the public debt-GDP ratio. As shown in Section 3, such a positive response is sufficient for sustainability.
A preliminary analysis of data using unit root tests for the debt-GDP ratio t b , the primary surplus-GDP ratio t s and the deficit-GDP ratio t d is illustrated in Tables 1-3, 10 The fiscal indicators (3) and (4)- (5) are constructed using averages over the last 10 years to express the growth-adjusted interest rate, as suggested by Blanchard (1990) .
respectively. From the unit root analysis, both t b and t s appear to be I(1) over the sample considered. This suggests specifying the possible relationship between the primary surplus-GDP ratio and the public debt-GDP ratio using a dynamic Error Correction Model (ECM) (Sargan, 1964; Engle and Granger, 1987) . This empirical specification enables us to incorporate the presence of inertia, which represents a typical feature of policy reaction functions. As a result, we take into account the possibility of a gradual adjustment in the response of the primary surplus to debt. A gradual fiscal stabilization policy can take place due, for example, to the presence of distortionary taxation or political costs. At the same time, the ECM constitutes an adequate estimation procedure in the presence of cointegrated variables according to Granger's Representation Theorem.
The estimated equation is a second-order ECM, given by:
A non-linear long-run estimator of the reaction of the surplus-GDP ratio to the beginningof-period debt-GDP ratio is given by: The Centre for Financial and Management Studies correlation nor heteroskedasticity. The residuals are I(0) and normally distributed. The hypothesis that the model is correctly specified is statistically supported. Table 5 To sum up, the "warnings" of fiscal indicators, based on forecasts, are reversed by the predictions of the test, based on historical data, according to which the hypothesis of an unsustainable course of U.S. fiscal policy is strongly rejected. Hence, we test for a structural break to have occurred in 2001. 11 The Chow test is computed for both the primary surplus-GDP ratio when specified in first differences and the data generating process of the primary surplus-GDP ratio given by the fiscal policy reaction function (16). Tables 6-7 give the results. From Table 6 Table 7 , the value of the Chow test on the equality of the parameters of the surplus equation (16) is 0.65552 11 The issue of structural shifts in the U.S. fiscal policy history has been extensively discussed in the literature. See, e.g., Hakkio and Rush (1991) , Tanner and Liu (1994) , Haug (1995), and Quintos (1995) . For the identification of "threshold effects" see Arestis, Cipollini and Fattouh (2004) , and Cipollini, Fattouh and Mouratidis (2007) . 12 In the latter case, we use the forecasts contained in Historical Tables, Budget of 1.9745, respectively) . In all cases considered, the hypothesis of a structural break is rejected by the data.
In conclusion, the absence of a structural change in regime is a critical signal in favor of the sustainability hypothesis. It leads us to accept the sustainability predictions of the test and to conclude that the potentially unsustainable course of U.S. fiscal policy from 2001 onwards, suggested by the use of fiscal indicators, is likely to reflect cyclical factors.
In other words, indicators are merely signalling the occurrence of a transitory period of high deficits. Such a short term phenomenon does not appear to have any substantial implication for the soundness and consistency of long-term fiscal policy.
Conclusions
The evolution of public debt in OECD countries requires some form of monitoring. In the present paper, we have proposed a simple strategy that enables one to integrate the use of indicators and tests of fiscal sustainability. Indicators are forward looking, in the sense that they are based on published forecasts, thereby reacting to a set of current and expected future conditions in fiscal policy. Tests, on the other hand, are backward looking, in the sense that they are based on a sample of past data. Our integrated approach allows to test the consistency of fiscal plans over the relevant sample period. Fiscal indicators derived from the present value budget constraint should also be calculated. Their interpretation, however, must be made contingent on results by tests, that is, according to whether or not there is a genuine sustainability problem.
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For instance, our results for the U.S. post-World War II data reinforce the earlier finding of sustainability obtained by Bohn (1998 Bohn ( , 2005 . According to the test performed, which is based on an Error Correction Model to allow for the possibility that the primary surplus adjusts gradually to achieve sustainability, the conduct of fiscal policy within sample is consistent with government solvency. On the other hand, indicators show the need for some fiscal adjustment starting from 2001 onwards.
When indicators and tests give conflicting results, the stability of the surplus data generating process should be checked in order to establish whether indicators are merely responding to contingent factors or are detecting the existence of long-term sustainability problems. In the case considered here, the indicators fail to signal the existence of a structural break in the primary surplus to GDP ratio. Deficit increases in the U.S. were thus a transitory phenomenon to be eventually reversed.
In conclusion, an important insight of our paper is that empirical study of government solvency requires the simultaneous analysis of indicators and tests. Research aimed at further integrating the formulation of indicators of sustainability with testing techniques promises to be fruitful for policy evaluation and design. 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 Discussion Paper 75
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The Centre for Financial and Management Studies The Dickey-Fuller regressions in Table 1a include an intercept and a linear trend. The Dickey-Fuller regressions in Table 1b Table 1a , we cannot reject the hypothesis that the debt-GDP ratio t b is I(1). The SBC and the HQC for the Dickey-Fuller regressions with intercept and a linear trend support an ADF(1) specification. The test statistic for the ADF (1) is −1.8758, which is greater than the 95% critical value for the augmented-DickeyFuller statistic (−3.4935) . The AIC would tend to support the choice of an ADF(4) specification, for which again we cannot reject that t b is I(1). The unit root tests reported in Table 1b are consistent with the hypothesis that t b ∆ is I(0). The SBC and the HQC for the Dickey-Fuller regressions with intercept and without trend lead to the choice of a DF specification. The value of the test statistic for the DF specification is −3.7755, which is less than the 95% critical value for the Dickey-Fuller statistic (−2.9167). The AIC would instead select an ADF(3) specification, for which the hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected even for . The Dickey-Fuller regressions in Table 2a include an intercept and a linear trend. The Dickey-Fuller regressions in Table 2b include an intercept but not a trend. 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with an intercept and a linear trend = -3.4935. 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with an intercept but not a trend = -2.9167. LL = Maximized log-likelihood AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
From Table 2a , we cannot reject the hypothesis that the primary surplus-GDP ratio t s is I(1). The AIC, the SBC and the HQC all select a DF specification. The test statistic for the DF regression is −3.0358, which is greater than the 95% critical value for the Dickey-Fuller statistic (−3.4935) . Table 2b provides empirical support to the hypothesis that t s ∆ is I(0). The SBC and the HQC conduct to a DF specification. The value of the test statistic for the DF specification is −7.2688, which is less than the 95% critical value for the DickeyFuller statistic (−2.9167). The AIC would tend to support an ADF(1) specification, which again allows us to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in t s ∆ .
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The Centre for Financial and Management Studies The Dickey-Fuller regressions in Table 3a include an intercept and a linear trend. The Dickey-Fuller regressions in Table 3b include an intercept but not a trend. 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with an intercept and a linear trend = -3.4935. 95% critical value for the augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic with an intercept but not a trend = -2.9167. LL = Maximized log-likelihood AIC = Akaike Information Criterion SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion HQC = Hannan-Quinn Criterion
From Table 3a , we cannot reject the hypothesis that the deficit-GDP ratio t d is I(1). The AIC, the SBC and the HQC all support a DF specification. The value of the test statistic for the DF specification is −2.6884, which is greater than the 95% critical value for the Dickey-Fuller statistic (−3.4935) . The results illustrated in Table 3b are consistent with the hypothesis that t d ∆ is I(0). The SBC and the HQC lead to select a DF specification. The value of the test statistic for the DF specification is −7.2656, which is less than the 95% critical value for the Dickey-Fuller statistic (−2.9167). The AIC would support an ADF(1) specification, for which again we reject the hypothesis of a unit root in Table- Standard errors in brackets.
1. Lagrange Multiplier test of residual serial correlation (Godfrey, 1978a (Godfrey, , 1978b (Koenker, 1981) . 3. 95% critical value for the Dickey-Fuller statistic (MacKinnnon, 1991). 4. Jarque-Bera test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals (Jarque and Bera, 1987) . 5. Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values (Ramsey, 1969) . * Statistically significant at 10%. ** Statistically significant at 5%. *** Statistically significant at 1%. 
